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WHAT IS THE NBA?
NADELLE GROSSMAN*
ABSTRACT
The National Basketball Association's (NBA) organizational structure is curious. While courts at times refer to the NBA as a joint venture, and at other
times as a single entity, their analyses are conducted not for state organization
law purposes, but to assess the NBA’s compliance with federal antitrust law.
Commentators, too, consistently address the NBA’s organizational structure
only under antitrust law and not state organization law. As I argue, given the
different purposes of these two legal regimes—antitrust law to protect consumers through preserving competition, and state organization law to ensure managers are faithful to the business purpose and to create a default structure among
owners and managers—conclusions about the NBA’s organizational structure
for purposes of compliance with antitrust law do not control the analysis of the
NBA’s structure for purposes of state organization law.
To fill the gap in case law and commentary, this article analyzes the NBA’s
organizational form under state organization law. This analysis is important
because the NBA’s organizational form impacts the rights and duties of the
member team-owners of the NBA. If, for example, the NBA is a joint venture
partnership under state organization law—that is, an association of team owners
who have come together to pursue a limited scope business for profit—then, by
default, its members would owe fiduciary duties to the other members and any
member could seek judicial expulsion of a recalcitrant member.

*

Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Any mistakes are my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Los Angeles (L.A.) Clippers’ owner Donald Sterling’s racist remarks
were made public, many urged the other National Basketball Association
(NBA) team-owners to expel Sterling under the provision of the NBA Constitution that gives NBA member team-owners the right on a three-quarter vote to
expel a fellow member.1 However, the existence of that right was questionable,
as none of the events that triggered this expulsion right clearly applied.2
Ultimately, the probate court presiding over the Sterling family trust that
held the Clippers found that Rochelle Sterling, Donald Sterling’s ex-wife, could
remove Donald Sterling as co-trustee from the trust and sell the team.3 The
matter was, thus, resolved without the NBA team-owners having to force such
a sale. However, mysteriously absent from the public outcry and calls for action
was any discussion about whether Donald Sterling breached fiduciary duties
1
See, e.g., Greg Botelho et al., NBA Commissioner Bans Clippers Owner Sterling, Pushes to ‘Force
a Sale’ of Team, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/29/us/clippers-sterling-scandal/ (last updated
Apr. 29, 2014); Kevin Trahan, How NBA Owners Can Force Donald Sterling to Sell the Los Angeles
Clippers, SB NATION (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2014/4/29/5665502/donald-sterling-suspension-la-clippers-sale-adam-silver; see also NBA, CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, at art. 13 (2012) [hereinafter NBA CONSTITUTION].
2
See Botelho et al., supra note 1; Trahan, supra note 1; see also NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note
1, para. 13.
3
See Eric Kelsey, Sterling's Last Bid to Halt L.A. Clippers Sale Blocked by Court, REUTERS (Aug.
13, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/14/us-nba-clippers-idUSKBN0GD29H20140814.
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owed to the NBA by making racist remarks, which clearly went against the best
interests of the NBA. Moreover, no one questioned whether an individual teamowner might have sought the judicial expulsion of Sterling apart from any right
of expulsion set out in the NBA Constitution. However, such duties and rights
might exist as a matter of state law, if the NBA were a partnership.4
In fact, for an organization that has been around for sixty-eight years,5 the
NBA’s structure is surprisingly opaque. On one hand, the relationship among
the members of the NBA is clearly contractual. The NBA’s own constitution
describes the NBA as a “contract among the Members.”6
On the other hand, the NBA is more than just a contract among its members.
The NBA Constitution even describes the NBA as an “[a]ssociation.”7 An association is an organization in which people unite to pursue a common purpose.8
If the purpose of the association is commercial in nature—a pursuit of profits
through business—and has not been created through any other explicit organizational form, then the association is a partnership.9 If the purpose is to pursue
a charitable or other nonprofit purpose, then the association is a nonprofit unincorporated association, or NUA.10 Either way, an association is not merely a
contractual relationship, and it triggers the application of specialized rules.
Some courts have characterized the NBA’s structure. For example, the
Ninth Circuit described the NBA as a New York joint venture.11 A joint venture
is a for-profit business formed to pursue a specific purpose.12 In contrast, the
Seventh Circuit held that the NBA looked more like a “single entity” than a joint
venture. 13 However, both of these decisions came in the context of challenges
to the NBA’s compliance with federal antitrust laws.14 Given the different purposes behind antitrust law and state organizational law—the former to protect
4

See discussion infra Part IV.
See generally Leonard Koppett, The NBA–1946: A New League, NBA (Dec. 7, 2007),
http://www.nba.com/heritageweek2007/newleague_071207.htmlhtml.
6
See NBA CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at art. 2.
7
See id. at art. 1.
8
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 148 (10th ed. 2014) (defining an association as the “gathering of
people for a common purpose” or “[a]n unincorporated organization that is not a legal entity separate
from the persons who compose it”).
9
See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
10
See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
11
See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1987).
12
See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
13
See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat. Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996).
14
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
5
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consumers through preserving competition,15 and the latter to ensure managers
are faithful to the business owners and to create a default structure16—conclusions about the NBA’s structure for antitrust law compliance purposes do not
control the analysis for state organization law purposes.
Yet, it is essential to determine what the NBA’s structure is for purposes of
state organization law because of the consequences that might flow from that
structure. Thus, this article considers how to legally categorize the NBA for
purposes of state organization law.
Importantly, the cooperative nature of NBA team-owners’ profit-seeking
and the absence of any other explicit organizational form suggest that the NBA
is a partnership. As a partnership, team-owners would owe the NBA and the
other members fiduciary duties.17 These include the duty to act in the best interests of the NBA.18 In the case of Donald Sterling, clearly his conduct was
not in the best interests of the NBA or the professional sport of basketball, as
his racist remarks reflected negatively on the sport and on the league. Moreover,
in a partnership, each partner, by default, has a right to seek a judicial expulsion
of a fellow partner who makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on business
with that partner.19 Here, Sterling’s conduct made it not reasonably practicable
to carry on partnership business with him, for the other members could no longer
trust or cooperate with such an offensive person. As Michael Jordan, NBA Hallof-Famer and owner of the Charlotte Hornets, expressed after Sterling’s comments were revealed, “‘[a]s an owner, I'm obviously disgusted that a fellow
team owner could hold such sickening and offensive views.’”20 This expulsion
right would exist apart from the members’ collective right to vote to expel another member under the NBA Constitution.
It is odd that the NBA’s organizational structure remains shrouded in mystery given the NBA’s outsized role in our society and economy. This article
fills that void by analyzing the NBA’s organizational structure under the two
potential frameworks that apply to it—partnership law and NUA law. As this
article explains, if neither of these legal schemes applies to the NBA, then, by
15

See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 173–74 and accompanying text.
17
See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
18
See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
19
See discussion infra Part III.B and accompanying text.
20
ESPN.com News Services, Magic, MJ Weigh in on Sterling, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/nba/story/_/id/10848070/michael-jordan-magic-johnson-lash-donald-sterling-purported-comments
(last updated Apr. 27, 2014).
16
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default, contract law governs the relationships by and among the team owners.
The following is the organizational structure of the rest of this article:
First, Part II provides an overview of the NBA’s structure. That discussion
emphasizes the nature of the relationship by and among the team owners as well
as their purposes for associating.
Next, Part III explains the two potential legal structures that fit the NBA—
partnership and NUA. That discussion also explains that contract law governs
if the NBA is neither a partnership nor an NUA. It explains the relationship
between partnership law and NUA law, on the one hand, and contract law on
the other.
Then, Part IV analyzes the NBA under these alternative structures. First, it
explains why conclusions about the NBA’s organizational structure for purposes of antitrust law do not control that analysis under state organization law.
Next, it explains why New York law governs the organizational law analysis.
Finally, the discussion explains why the NBA is best described as a partnership.
Alternatively, it explains why the NBA is an NUA.
Finally, Part V reviews key consequences that flow from the NBA’s organizational structure, focusing specifically on the impact of that conclusion on situations such as that involving Donald Sterling.
II. NBA STRUCTURE
The NBA is the national body organized to “operate a league consisting of
professional basketball teams . . . .”21 The NBA league currently consists of
thirty teams.22
The NBA has not been incorporated, formed as a limited partnership or limited liability company, or organized through any other organizational form by
making a filing with a Secretary of State. Rather, it is constituted through two
private agreements—its Constitution and Bylaws.23
By and large, the NBA Constitution sets out the governance structure of the
NBA, including the rights and responsibilities of the team owners, the board of

21

NBA Constitution, supra note 1, art. 2.
See
FAN
RELATIONS
FAQ,
NBA.COM,
http://www.nba.com/help/fan_relations_faq.html#fanfaq14 (last visited Nov. 23, 2014).
23
Ashby Jones, NBA’s Decision Against Clippers’ Owner: Is it Legal?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Aug.
29, 2014, 7:11 pm), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/04/29/nbas-decision-against-clippers-owner-is-itlegal/. See generally NBA Constitution, supra note 1.
22
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governors, and the Commissioner.24 The NBA Bylaws, in contrast, lay out the
framework for the operation of the NBA, including player requirements.25
The NBA Constitution provides that it and the “By-laws constitute[] a contract among the Members of the Association.”26 Still, as Part III explains, this
language does not preclude a finding that the NBA is a partnership or a NUA,
depending on the purpose for which the NBA is operated.27 In fact, partnerships
and NUAs are themselves creatures of contract.28
According to its Constitution, the NBA is not operated for profit.29 This is
consistent with the NBA Constitution’s principles of organization, which state
that “[t]his Association is organized to operate a league consisting of professional basketball teams, each of which shall be operated by a Member of the
Association.”30 In other words, the NBA Constitution declares a non-commercial purpose.
Despite this, the NBA is not tax-exempt.31 Potentially, the NBA has not
elected to be treated as a tax-exempt organization because it actually earns a
profit. However, the NBA could have chosen to not be treated as a tax-exempt
entity for reasons not tied to its generation of profits, such as the fact that as a
for-profit, it need not publicly file tax reports.32
A broader view of the NBA’s financial arrangements, though, calls into
question whether the NBA is in fact a non-profit. First, while not every team

24

See generally NBA Constitution, supra note 1.
See generally id.
26
Id. at art. 2.
27
See discussion infra Part III.
28
See discussion infra Part III.
29
NBA Constitution, supra note 1, art. 2.
30
See id.
31
David Van Den Berg, NFL’s Tax Exemption Faces Scrutiny, TAX ANALYSTS (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Articles/F0E1DC440C69E6A785257C2E006AEE33?OpenDocument. The fact that the NBA is not taxexempt was verified by searching the IRS database of Form 990s, which tax-exempt organizations must
file.
See EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS SELECT CHECK, Internal Revenue Service,
http://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2014); see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012) (specifically
exempting “professional football leagues” but making no specific exemption for other professional
sports leagues or associations); Kristi Dosh, Examining NFL’s Tax-Exempt Status, ESPN (June 4,
2013), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9342479/examining-nfl-tax-exempt-status-challenged-us-senator-tom-coburn (noting that “the NBA has never been tax exempt”).
32
See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Politics, and Privacy, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 806–
12 (2012) (discussing federal disclosure requirements).
25
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generates a profit every year, NBA teams clearly generate profits for their owners.33 In fact, the public discourse around NBA teams involves much discussion
about team profitability. For example, as Steve Ballmer stated at the time of his
purchase of the L.A. Clippers from the Sterlings earlier this year, “‘[t]here’s real
earnings in this business. There’s real upside opportunity. So compared to the
things I looked at in tech, this was a reasonable purchase and it’s one I'm really
excited about.’”34
Making an investment in a professional basketball team also gives its owner
a sense of personal satisfaction. As Ballmer also stated, “I'm really excited
about the product. I love it. I've been to over a hundred basketball games in the
last year, and that's just high school games.”35 Yet a love for the sport of basketball does not distinguish Ballmer or any other team-owner from entrepreneurs, who also have passion for the businesses that they start.36 In other words,
having passion for one’s business does not indicate a non-profit motive.
There are three primary sources of NBA team revenues; one is gate receipts.37 The other two primary sources of team revenues stem from contracts
entered into by the NBA on behalf of all of the teams. First, the NBA, on behalf
of the teams, generates revenues from granting the right to nationally and internationally broadcast games to radio, television, and cable networks.38 The NBA
teams equally share these revenues.39 Second, the NBA—or more specifically,
33

See Kristi Dosh, NBA Jersey Ads Could Push Teams to a Profit, ESPN (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/2362/nba-jersey-ads-could-push-teams-to-a-profit
(stating that in the 2011–2012 season, eighteen teams were profitable); Chris Smith, The NBA’s Most
and
Least
Profitable
Teams,
FORBES
(Jan.
23,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/01/23/the-nbas-most-and-least-profitable-teams/ (noting
that twenty-one teams made a profit in the 2011–12 season). There may not be agreement on which
teams are profitable as not all information needed to make this calculation is disclosed to the public.
34
Arash Markazi, Steve Ballmer New Clippers Owner, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/nba/story/_/id/11343259/steve-ballmer-officially-new-owner-los-angeles-clippers (last updated
Aug. 13, 2014).
35
Id.
36
See Dave Lavinsky, Starting a Small Business: Passion is Key, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davelavinsky/2013/11/14/starting-a-small-business-passion-is-key/ (noting “how important passion is when starting a small business or any venture”).
37
According to Forbes, the L.A. Clippers’ gate receipts for 2013 were $41 million, while its total
revenues were $128 million. See Los Angeles Clippers¸ FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/teams/losangeles-clippers/ (last updated Jan. 2014). Thus, approximately one-third of the L.A. Clippers’ revenues in 2014 came from gate receipts.
38
See Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1340 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
39
Id.
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NBA Properties Inc., a separate entity owned by the NBA teams—generates
revenues from the grant of exclusive licenses to merchandise team names, insignias, and other similar intellectual property.40 The teams also equally share
these merchandising royalties.41
In addition to the sharing of broadcasting and merchandising revenues, the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the NBA and the NBA Players Association—the union representing the NBA players—provides for revenue sharing among teams.42 This revenue sharing is designed to financially
equalize teams.43 One primary way teams are financially equalized under the
CBA is through a luxury tax.44 That is, every team that exceeds a maximum
team salary cap must pay the NBA a tax in the amount of that excess.45 Those
tax proceeds are then either used by the NBA or shared by non-tax-paying
teams.46 This and other revenue-sharing devices set out in the CBA are designed
to maintain competitive balance in the league.47
Even where a team does not generate significant annual profits for its owners, owning a NBA team is a profitable enterprise. This is apparent from the
Sterlings’ sale of the L.A. Clippers. Since 2006, the Clippers have not generated
an annual operating income of more than $15 million.48 Yet the Sterlings made
a hefty sum when they sold the Clippers for $2 billion in 2014.49
40

See id. at 1339.
Id. at 1340.
42
See NBA, NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, at art. VII(a)(8) (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter
CBA] available at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2011.
43
See Larry Coon, 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement, LARRY COON’S NBA SALARY CAP
FAQ, at Questions 1, 24, http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).
44
See CBA, supra note 42, art. VII, § 12. See also Coon, supra note 43, at Question 24.
45
See Coon, supra note 43, at Question 21.
46
See id. at Question 22. For a thoughtful discussion of the 2011 changes to the revenue-sharing
provisions of the CBA, and why the increase in the luxury tax rate has not led to a more equalized
distribution of revenues, see Matthew J. Parlow, Lessons from the NBA Lockout: Union Democracy,
Public Support, and the Folly of the National Basketball Players Association, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 10–
12 (2014).
47
Coon, supra note 43, at Questions 1, 24.
48
See Los Angeles Clippers, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/teams/los-angeles-clippers/ (last updated Jan. 2014) (showing that since 2006, the L.A. Clippers have not generated more than $15.7 million in operating income).
49
See Kelsey, supra note 3 (“Sterling will still profit from the sale, pocketing the $2 billion along
with his wife.”). While some news accounts report that the Sterlings are making a profit in the amount
of the full purchase price on the sale, obviously they only profit to the extent the purchase price exceeds
the price they paid for the team plus any additional capital contributions they made and any debt owed
by the team.
41
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In terms of governance, the NBA Constitution creates a board of governors.50 The governors on that board “have the general supervision of the affairs
of the Association . . . .”51 Thus, the board of governors is charged with general
oversight responsibilities. This is similar to the role of a board of directors in a
business corporation, which board is charged with overseeing the business and
affairs of the corporation.52 While the NBA is not a corporation, it is useful to
draw an analogy to the corporate form, for the corporate form is a familiar legal
organizational form with a hierarchical management structure somewhat similar
to that of the NBA.
Each NBA governor is selected by a member.53 The term “member” generally refers to a team-owner. More precisely, a member is a person or entity
that has been granted the rights, privileges, and benefits to organize and operate
a professional basketball team to play in the league operated by the NBA.54
Since members that are entities must act through agents, the NBA Constitution declares that “an action on behalf of a Member by any of its Owners,
employees, officers, directors, managers, agents or representatives, or its Governor or Alternate Governors, shall be the action of a Member.”55 In other
words, the NBA Constitution designates who acts on behalf of an organizational
member for purposes of NBA action. This statement establishes the power of
virtually any agent or other representative of, as well as any governor selected
by, an organizational member to bind that organization. On the other hand, an
organizational owner would certainly have its own internal approval processes
for taking action as a member in the NBA, and a person acting without such
approval would be acting wrongfully within that organization. Moreover, if the
NBA were aware of a person purporting to act on behalf of an organizational
member knowing that person in fact did not have authority to act, it is doubtful
the NBA could rely on this provision in the NBA Constitution to protect its
reliance on that person’s action.56

50

NBA Constitution, supra note 1, at art. 18(a).
Id.
52
EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS & DIRECTORS:
RIGHTS, DUTIES & LIABILITIES § 1:2 (2013).
53
NBA Constitution, supra note 1, at art. 18(b).
54
Id. at Interpretation, Definition of “Member.”
55
Id. at Interpretation (a)(8).
56
Such knowledge would remove the person’s apparent authority. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. c (1958).
51
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The governor election process is unlike the director election process in corporations, where all shareholders vote on the election of directors.57 In the
NBA, in contrast, each member selects its own governor to the board of governors.58 The other members do not vote on or otherwise approve of any other
member’s selected governor.59 Moreover, a member may replace a governor
selected by that member at will.60 Thus, the board of governors is essentially a
body comprised of the representatives selected by the controlling owners of
NBA teams.
Likely because of the governor selection process, and the power each member has to appoint and remove its selected governor at will, each governor is
described in the NBA Constitution as an agent of the member who selected that
person with authority to bind that member for purposes of NBA action.61 In
contrast, a director of a corporation, when acting in that capacity, is not individually an agent of the shareholder nominating that director or an agent of any
other shareholder.62 Rather, the directors act together as a body in representing
the interests of shareholders.63
Still, in the NBA, a governor “may be removed with substantial cause by a

57
See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, chap. 1 (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 7.20 (2002). This need
not always be the case. For instance, a shareholder may negotiate to vote as a separate series for one or
more directors. 5 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 2026 (2011). Still, that shareholder would likely not elect all directors. Moreover,
in privately-held corporations, through private voting arrangements, shareholders often agree which
shareholders have the right to nominate directors, and all of the other shareholders agree to vote their
shares for the selected nominees. 1 ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 4:12 (Rev. 3d ed. 2014). In each case, directors are elected to represent the body of
shareholders and not merely those who nominated or elected them. See, e.g., Klaassen v. Allegro Dev.
Corp., No. 8626.VCL, 2013 WL 5967028, at *12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 7, 2013) (“Delaware decisions consistently reject the related concept of ‘constituency directors’ as well as the notion that a director appointed by a particular minority stockholder or a particular class or series of stock can or should serve
the particular interests of the appointing entity.”); see also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 771–72 (2008) (presuming the directors’ fiduciary duties to all stockholders
trump contract law expectations by specific constituencies, but acknowledging that “so long as the
constituency directors’ representative capacity is transparently disclosed to stockholders and fellow
directors, constituency directors could be permitted to advocate the interests of their sponsors”).
58
NBA Constitution, supra note 1, at art. 18(b).
59
See id.
60
Id.
61
See id. at art. 18(b), Interpretation, Definition of “Governor” (a)(6).
62
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
63
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all Governors . . . .”64 This is unlike the corporate
context, where the board of directors does not have the power to remove any
other director.65 In the case of corporations, only shareholders have the power
to remove directors.66 This power also envisions the governors acting as agents
of the team-owners, rather than solely as members of a governing body.
In addition to being charged with general oversight over the NBA, the board
of governors has many other governance rights under the NBA Constitution.
For example, a vote of the board of governors is needed to add a new member
to the NBA;67 to approve of any transfer by a member of that person’s membership interest;68 to expel a member where circumstances warrant expulsion;69 to
require the members to contribute more capital than the annual amount specified
in the NBA Constitution;70 to amend the Bylaws;71 to approve any unusual expenses by the Commissioner;72 to elect the Commissioner;73 and to remove the
Commissioner.74 With such broad powers, there is no doubt that the board of
governors largely controls the NBA, even though the board delegates day-today management responsibilities to the Commissioner.75
Under the NBA Constitution, the Commissioner is the “Chief Executive
Officer of the League and [is] charged with protecting the integrity of the game
of professional basketball and preserving public confidence in the League.”76
Moreover, the Commissioner is charged with resolving disputes among members and addressing any wrongdoing by members.77 Generally, the Commissioner’s remedial power in the case of member wrongdoing is to suspend the
member, or impose fines or penalties.78
64

NBA Constitution, supra note 1, art. 18(d).
E.W.H., Annotation, Power of Directors of Private Corporation to Remove Officers or Fellow
Directors, 63 A.L.R. FED, 776, at 14 (1929).
66
14A N.Y. JUR. 2D BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS § 572 (2009).
67
NBA Constitution, supra note 1, art. 4(d).
68
Id. at art. 5(f).
69
Id. at arts. 13, 14(f) & (g).
70
Id. at art. 32.
71
Id. at art. 17(a).
72
Id. at art. 24(g).
73
Id. at art. 24(a).
74
Id.
75
Id. at art. 24(c).
76
Id. at art. 24(a).
77
See id. at arts. 24(d)–(e).
78
See id. at arts. 24(i), (j), & (l).
65

GROSSMAN FINAL FORMATTED

112

1/23/2015 11:20 AM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1

Here, the Commissioner functions like a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
a business corporation. However, in a corporation, a CEO does not have the
discretion to suspend or fine a shareholder for misconduct.79 As such, the Commissioner has more power over shareholders than a CEO in a corporation.
Neither the NBA Constitution nor the Bylaws contains a choice of law provision. On the other hand, in the only provision that refers to a governing law—
the provision on dissolution—the NBA Constitution contains a New York
choice of law provision.80 The NBA’s corporate office and headquarters are
also in New York.81
III. POSSIBLE LEGAL CATEGORIZATIONS OF THE NBA
There are two potential theories for the state law structure of the NBA,
which, as mentioned above, has not been organized as a corporation, limited
liability company, or limited partnership—juridical entities formed upon the
making of a filing with a secretary of state. First, the NBA is arguably a partnership, as an association of team owners operating a basketball league for
profit. Alternatively, it is arguably a NUA, or an association of team owners
operating a basketball league not for profit. If the NBA does not fit under either
of these categories, then it is solely a contract among the team-owners. In fact,
many contractual relationships exist without creating separate legal entities. On
the other hand, a contractual relationship can also be a legally cognizable organization.
Which of these organizational structures applies to the NBA, if any, determines the duties and default rules that apply to the NBA members and managers. For instance, if the NBA is a partnership, then the team owners—the partners in the organization—would owe fiduciary duties to their fellow partners.82
Moreover, there would be a set of default rules to govern the team members’
relationships, including the expulsion of a member.83 These same rules would
apply in some jurisdictions if the NBA were a NUA. If, on the other hand, the
79

Shareholders sometimes do agree with other shareholders that specified events trigger a buy-out
right of a fellow shareholder. See Doniger v. Rye Psychiatric Hosp. Ctr. Inc., 122 A.D.2d 873, 875
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986). However, the CEO is not usually given the discretion to exercise that right.
80
NBA Constitution, supra note 1, at art. 16.
81
FAN RELATIONS FAQ, NBA, http://www.nba.com/help/fan_relations_faq.html#fanfaq14 (last
visited Dec. 2, 2014); NBA CORPORATE OFFICE AND HEADQUARTERS, CORPORATEOFFICE,
http://www.corporateoffice.com/NBA.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).
82
See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
83
See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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NBA is not one of these legally cognizable entities, then the NBA Constitution
and Bylaws, along with principles of contract law, would govern the relationships by and among members and managers.
Each of these alternative legal structures is discussed next. First, Section A
discusses what a contractual relationship is, as that is the default structure that
applies if the NBA is neither a partnership nor a NUA. Next, Section B explores
what a partnership is. Section C then considers what a NUA is. Part IV analyzes
the NBA under these principles.
A. Contract
A contract is an agreement between two or more parties that creates obligations that are enforceable.84 The parties themselves bargain for the obligation
or obligations to be enforced.85
The concept of enforcement refers to the availability of a remedy for a
breach of the agreed-upon obligation.86 There are many defenses to enforcement. For example, a court will not enforce a contract, or a contractual term,
that violates public policy.87 Absent one of these defenses, a court will provide
a remedy for a party’s failure to perform its agreed-on obligation.
Thus, the crux of a contract is that the parties have privately bargained for
a set of obligations and rights. By and large, contract law does not impose rights
and obligations on the parties; rather, it is the parties who specifically bargain
for those rights and obligations. Yet, contract law does imply some obligations.
Importantly, each party has an implied obligation to act in accordance with good
faith and fair dealing.88 That obligation requires that neither party seek to undermine the benefits the other party was expecting under the contract.89
In some contexts, the common law of contracts overlaps with a separate
legal scheme that governs the relationship created through the contract. The
extent of that overlap depends on the nature of the contract.

84

Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 590 (1819).
1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (4th ed. 2007).
86
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979).
87
See id. at ch. 8 Introductory Note.
88
See id. at § 205; see also Daitch Crystal Dairies, Inc. v. Neisloss, 8 A.D.2d 965, 965 (1959), aff’d
mem. 167 N.E.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. 1960).
89
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
85
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For example, a transaction in goods falls under article two of a state’s uniform commercial code (UCC).90 UCC article two contains some mandatory
terms. For example, section 2-201 requires contracts for the sale of goods for
the price of $1,000 or more to be in writing to be enforceable.91 The UCC also
sets out some default terms, or contractual terms that apply, unless the parties
otherwise agree. For example, section 2-305 implies a reasonable price if parties have concluded a contract for the sale of goods and not specified a price.92
This section does not have any applicability if the parties have agreed on a price,
thereby contracting around this default term. Moreover, the common law of
contracts still applies to transactions in goods where article two does not apply.93
Thus, despite the existence of a separate statutory scheme for transactions in
goods, the common law of contracts remains applicable.
Many contracts contain choice-of-law provisions. That is, they select the
law that applies to those contracts. Because contract law is a matter of private
bargain, courts generally respect those choice-of-law provisions unless they violate a policy in the enforcing court’s jurisdiction.94 On the other hand, a
choice-of-law provision is not necessary to make a contract binding. Where a
contract does not contain such a provision, a court will apply the law of the state
with the closest ties to the transaction.95
B. Partnership/Joint-Venture
Partnership law is another area of law that overlaps with contract law. The
overlap arises because partners enter into contracts between themselves to set
out the terms of their partnership.96 Yet, partners need not enter into an express
contract to form a partnership.97 Rather, a partnership exists where two or more
persons carry on as co-owners a business for profit.98 That is true even where
90
See Uniform Commercial Code § 2–102 (2002) [hereinafter UCC]; accord New York Uniform
Commercial Code Law § 2–102 (2014) [hereinafter N.Y. UCC].
91
See UCC, supra note 90, at § 2–201; accord N.Y. UCC, supra note 90, at § 2–201.
92
See UCC, supra note 90, at § 2–305; accord N.Y. UCC, supra note 90, at § 2–305.
93
UCC, supra note 90, at § 1–103; accord N.Y. UCC, supra note 90, at § 1–103.
94
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
95
Id. at § 294.
96
15A N.Y. JUR. 2D BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS § 1558 (2009).
97
See Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 202(a) (1997) [hereinafter RUPA]; J. WILLIAM CALLISON
& MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS § 5.7 (2013).
98
See RUPA, supra note 97, at § 202(a); accord New York Partnership Law § 10 (1999) [hereinafter
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parties do not specifically intend to form a partnership, or where they legally
categorize their relationship as something other than a partnership.99 It is also
true where the business does not actually generate a profit, so long as the profit
motive is present.100
By focusing on business profits, a partnership must clearly be tied to the
pursuit of commercial activity.101 In fact, just sharing profits leads to a presumption that parties have formed a partnership.102 It is then up to a party disputing the existence of a partnership to show that the relationship is something
other than a partnership.103
There are many justifications for partnership law. Importantly, in a partnership, partners direct their acts toward a collective business purpose—that is, toward a commercial goal or goals. Moreover, each partner can individually act
toward that purpose, thereby binding the collective.104 Partnership law imposes
obligations on the parties to hold them to that common purpose.105 Importantly,
it sets out fiduciary duties that partners owe to one another.106 As was famously
proclaimed by Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals in Meinhard
v. Salmon in the context of a partnership constituting a joint-venture, “[j]oint
adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues,
the duty of finest loyalty.”107 The duty of loyalty requires partners to act in the
best interest of the partnership and refrain from acting in their own personal
interest.108 Partners also owe a duty of care, which generally requires partners

N.Y. P’Ship].
99
See RUPA, supra note 97, at § 202(a) & (c); CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 97, at § 5.7.
100
CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 97, at § 5.10.
101
LAURA HUNTER DIETZ ET AL., AM. JUR. § 1 (2d ed. 2014) (“A partnership exists only in a business or commercial setting”).
102
See RUPA, supra note 97, at § 202(c)(3); accord N.Y. P’Ship, supra note 98, at § 11.4.
103
See CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 97, at § 5.17.
104
See id. at § 1.1 (noting that partnership law is closely tied to agency law “because each partner
is an agent for the other partners and for the partnership business”).
105
See id.
106
See N.Y. P’Ship, supra note 98, at § 43; see also Terra Venture v. JDN Real Estate–Overland
Park, L.P., 443 F.3d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 2006); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928);
Lightsey v. Marshall, 992 P.2d 904, 908 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999); Silverstein v. Last, 383 A.2d 718, 721
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). Where there is a managing partner or co-venturer, courts have imposed the fiduciary duty on the managing venturer. See, e.g., Indep. Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Zanger, 538
F. Supp. 2d 704, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
107
Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
108
CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 97, at § 12.4.
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to make business decisions in good faith.109 Such fiduciary duties arise because
of the trust and confidence placed in, and accepted by, the partners to manage
the association.110
Partnership law, for the most part, only sets out default terms of the partner
relationship—that is, terms that apply unless the parties otherwise agree.111
Such default terms reflect the largely contractual nature of the partnership relationship.112 Yet, where parties fail to specify all of the terms governing their
relationship—a relationship that may continue into the distant and unforeseeable future—partnership law creates a set of default terms to govern that relationship.
Still, there are some mandatory aspects of partnership law. For instance,
under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), partners may not eliminate
the fiduciary duty of loyalty.113 Instead, they can only modify that duty in limited ways if not manifestly unreasonable.114 Moreover, partners cannot unreasonably reduce the duty of care.115 These mandatory provisions recognize that
partners individually have discretion to commit the collective enterprise.116
Thus, there is a need to control that discretion.117 In other words, the mere status
of being a partner justifies imposing a minimal mandatory duty.
Not all states restrict partners’ power to eliminate fiduciary duties. For example, New York’s partnership law does not contain such a statutory restriction.
Consistently, New York case law permits contractual parties broad freedom to
modify, even eliminate, fiduciary duties.118
As another example of a mandatory aspect of partnership law, under RUPA,
parties may not modify the right of a court to expel a partner due to that partner’s

109

Id. at § 12.2.
See id.
111
See RUPA, supra note 97, at Prefatory Note.
112
See id.
113
See id. at § 103(b)(3).
114
See id. at § 103(b)(3)(i).
115
See id. at § 103(b)(4).
116
See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligations, 5 DUKE L.J.
879, 908–09 (1988).
117
See id. at 909–10.
118
See BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 866 F. Supp. 2d 257, 269–70 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (stating that fiduciary duty waivers are effective in New York and citing numerous cases that
stand for this proposition).
110
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misconduct, breach of duty, or where that partner makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on business with that partner.119 This mandatory judicial right
of expulsion acknowledges the vulnerability of a partner to a fellow partner’s
discretion in binding the partnership. Given this vulnerability, it protects a partner’s right to ask a court to expel another partner who is engaging in wrongdoing.
Here, New York partnership law does not have a default expulsion right.120
Rather, New York law gives each partner a right to seek a judicial decree of
dissolution due to a fellow partner’s misconduct.121 In New York, a partner may
request dissolution of a partnership where a partner is “guilty of such conduct
as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business.”122 Alternatively,
a court may decree dissolution where a partner willfully or persistently breaches
the partnership agreement or “conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in
partnership with him.”123 Where a New York partnership is dissolved due to a
partner’s wrongful conduct, the remaining partners can elect to continue the
partnership in the same name.124 Because of this right to continue with the partnership business, dissolution due to a partner’s misconduct followed by a continuation of the partnership by the other partners has substantially the same effect as an expulsion.
Unlike RUPA, New York’s partnership statute does not remove the partners’ ability to modify a partner’s right to seek judicial dissolution due to a fellow partner’s misconduct.125 In fact, one New York court has held that partners
can eliminate this right to seek judicial dissolution so long as they do so specifically and unequivocally.126
119

RUPA, supra note 97, at § 103(b)(7).
Ehrlich v. Howe, 848 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
121
See N.Y. P’Ship, supra note 98, at §§ 62, 63. While New York partnership law follows traditional partnership law in providing for dissolution rather than expulsion, in circumstances of judicial
dissolution due to partners wrongdoing, it allows the continuing partners to continue the partnership
rather than liquidate. Id. at § 69(2)(b). As such, there is not much difference between an expulsion and
dissolution due to partner wrongdoing.
122
Id. at § 63(c).
123
Id. at § 63(d).
124
Id. at § 69(2)(b).
125
See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., No. 95 CIV.5575 (KMW), 1996 WL
340002, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1996).
126
See id. (holding that parties to a partnership agreement have the right to contract around nearly
any provision of partnership law, even the right to seek a judicial dissolution, but noting that the waiver
120
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A relationship may be a partnership even where partners limit the purpose
of the business to a specific purpose. In that context, the partnership is referred
to as a “joint venture.” 127 Partnership law largely applies to that joint venture
in the same way that it applies to partnerships with broader purposes.128
State law governs the terms of a partnership.129 Partners can, and often do,
select which state’s laws apply to that partnership.130 Courts will generally respect that choice unless it violates public policy.131 Where partners do not designate a choice of law for a partnership, courts will apply the law of the state
with the most ties,132 which usually means the state of either the partnership’s
principal place of business or its chief executive office.133
C. Nonprofit Unincorporated Association (NUA)
NUAs are similar to partnerships in that they are formed by people who join
together to achieve a common objective.134 The primary difference is that the
participants in an NUA, in pursuing a common objective, do not seek profits.135
The legal regime that applies to an NUA, as with a partnership, is determined by state law. However, states usually take one of two approaches to the
regulation of these entities. Some states have adopted legislation to regulate
must be specific and unequivocal).
127
See RUPA, supra note 97, at § 202 cmt. 31 (“Relationships that are called ‘joint ventures' are
partnerships if they otherwise fit the definition of a partnership.”). See also Terra Venture, Inc. v. JDN
Real Estate–Overland Park, L.P., 443 F.3d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (“‘When the
relationship of joint adventurers exists, the parties stand in a close relationship of trust and confidence
and are bound by the same standards of good conduct and square dealing as are required of partners.
’”).
128
See, e.g., supra note 107 and accompanying text; see also RUPA, supra note 97, at § 202 cmt.
2.
129
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 294 (1971).
130
See id. at § 294 cmt. (b).
131
See id. at § 187.
132
Id. at § 294
133
See RUPA, supra note 97, at §106(b), §106(b) cmt. (providing for a governing law tied to the
partnership’s chief executive office); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 294 cmt. (d)
(1971) (noting that the jurisdiction with the most ties is usually where the partnership does all or substantially all of its business under its agreement, if such a place exists).
134
REVISED UNIFORM UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASSOCIATION ACT § 2(8) (2008) [hereinafter
RUUNAA] available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Unincorporated%20Nonprofit%20Association%20Act%20%281992%29%281996%29.
135
See id. at § 2(8) cmt. 8 (requiring that members join together to pursue one or more common,
nonprofit purposes).
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NUAs. For instance, five states have adopted statutes based on the Revised
Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act (RUUNAA) drafted and
promoted by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC).136 Moreover, ten states
have adopted statutes based on the RUUNAA’s predecessor, the Uniform Nonprofit Association Act.137 In contrast, other states regulate NUAs through a
patchwork of common law and statutes that govern limited aspects of their operation.138
Those common law regimes often view NUAs as amalgams of their members rather than separate legal entities.139 As such, there is no separate legal
entity, either to bind to contracts, or to sue or be sued.140 In essence, these entities are not entities at all, but solely contractual relationships.
New York is an example of a jurisdiction that does not statutorily recognize
NUAs. Rather, they are regulated through the common law.141 As such, NUAs
are primarily treated as contracts and are not considered to be legal entities separate from their members.142
Here, again, which state’s laws apply depends on the selected governing

136

See generally UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASSOCIATION ACT
(2008),
available
at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Unincorporated%20Nonprofit%20Association%20Act%20%282008%29.
137
See generally id. This number was derived by counting the states that the ULC shows as having
adopted its original uniform unincorporated nonprofit association act (twelve), and subtracting out the
two states (Arkansas and D.C.) that adopted the later Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association
Act.
138
RUUNAA, supra note 134, at Prefatory Note. Even in states where unincorporated associations
are regulated by the common law, some types of nonprofit associations are regulated, such as unions
and churches. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. SERV. § 201 (2011).
139
RUUNAA, supra note 134, at Prefatory Note.
140
See 12 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 35:72 (4th ed. 2012) (stating that apart from states that
statutorily recognize NUAs’ power to enter into contracts and to sue and be sued, “the majority rule
appears to be to the effect that a statute that permits an unincorporated association merely to sue or be
sued in its association name does not change the legal status of the association so as to render it liable
on contracts entered into in the association name.”).
141
People v. Norwegian Underwriters, 247 N.Y.S. 707, 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931) (“Unincorporated
associations are mere creatures of contract freely formed at common law without any grant from the
sovereign.”). For a sample of some New York statutory provisions applicable to nonprofit associations,
see N.Y. GEN. ASS’N § 12 (2009–2014) (empowering the nonprofit association to sue and be sued);
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS §§ 53–57 (2014) (requiring nonexempt nonprofit associations with twenty members
or more that require members to submit an oath as a condition to membership to submit a copy of that
oath along with other documents to the secretary of state).
142
Martin v. Curran, 101 N.E.2d 683, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951); L&L Assocs. Holding Corp. v.
Charity United Baptist Church, 935 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452–53 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
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law in the associated parties’ contract.143 Failing that, as with all contracts, a
court will apply the law with the most ties to the transaction.144 RUUNAA specifies that in that case, the governing law is the law of the state where the association has its “main place of activities . . . .”145 RUUNAA uses this standard
rather than an NUA’s chief executive office to determine the governing law because many NUAs are informal and do not have executive offices.146 To the
extent a nonprofit is multijurisdictional, RUUNAA contemplates that the members will specify which state’s laws govern.147
IV. WHAT IS THE NBA?
This Part tackles the question of how to characterize the NBA for state organization law purposes. First, Section A analyzes whether the NBA’s organizational form is dictated by judicial opinions decided under antitrust law. As
that discussion explains, judicial opinions drawing conclusions about the
NBA’s structure for purposes of antitrust law are not conclusive for purposes of
state business organization law. Next, Section B analyzes which state’s laws to
look to in determining what legal framework applies to the NBA’s organization.
As that discussion explains, New York law applies no matter whether the NBA
is a partnership, an NUA, or a contract. Next, Section C explains why the NBA
is likely a partnership governed by New York partnership law. Alternatively, it
contemplates that the NBA is an NUA under New York law. Part V then addresses several key consequences that flow from that conclusion.
A. NBA Structure Under Antitrust Law
Some courts have described the NBA as a joint venture. For example, in
National Basketball Ass’n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc.,148 the Ninth Circuit
described the NBA as a New York joint venture.149 On the other hand, the
NBA’s structure was not at issue in SDC Basketball Club. As such, it is not
clear how the court concluded that the NBA was a joint venture, or whether it
viewed the NBA as a joint venture for purposes of state organization laws.
143

See RUUNAA, supra note 134, at § 4(b).
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
145
See RUUNAA, supra note 134, at § 4 (b).
146
See id. at § 4 cmt. 2.
147
Id.
148
See generally Nat'l Basketball Ass'n. v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987).
149
Id. at 564.
144
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The NBA’s structure was an issue in Chicago Professional Sports L.P. v.
National Basketball Association, referred to as Chicago Bulls II.150 In Chicago
Bulls II, the chief issues were whether the NBA could cap the number of games
for which a NBA team could grant a national broadcast right, and whether the
NBA could charge a “broadcast fee” on team-licensed national broadcasts without running afoul of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.151 Section 1 of the Sherman
Act precludes contracts among two or more distinct business entities in restraint
of trade.152 Except for certain activities that are per se unlawful, to violate section one of the Sherman Act, the restraint on trade must be unreasonable.153
However, as has been traditionally analyzed, Section 1 of the Sherman Act does
not apply to single firms, as a single firm cannot collude with itself in restraint
of trade.154 Indeed, participants in a single firm are expected to cooperate.155
On this point, while the Seventh Circuit remanded the issue of whether the
NBA was a single entity for purposes of the Sherman Act, the court held that
whether the NBA looks like one firm depends on the perspective from which
the inquiry is conducted.156 However, “when acting in the broadcast market the
NBA is closer to a single firm than to a group of independent firms.”157
In 2010, the Supreme Court heard a similar antitrust challenge against the
National Football League (NFL) in American Needle Inc. v. National Football
League.158 In that case, American Needle challenged the right of the NFL teams
to agree to grant an exclusive license to produce and sell trademarked headgear
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.159 The Supreme Court focused its inquiry
not on whether the NFL was a single entity or a joint venture, as had the Seventh
Circuit in Chicago Bulls II.160 In fact, the Court eschewed an analysis tied to
organizational form.161 Rather, it focused on whether the NFL teams had joined
Chi. Prof’l Sports L.P. v. Nat'l. Basketball Ass'n., 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id at 595.
152
See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (2006).
153
See Bd. of Trade City of Chi. v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). For a critique of the rule of
reason, see Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in U.S.
Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 591, 603 (2012).
154
Chi. Prof’l Sports L.P., 95 F.3d at 599.
155
Id. at 598.
156
See id. at 600.
157
Id. at 600; see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911).
158
See generally Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
159
Id. at 187.
160
Id. at 191–92.
161
See id.
150
151
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together separate decision-makers in concerted action such that the marketplace
was deprived of a diversity of entrepreneurial interests and, thus, actual or potential competition.162 If so, the NFL teams remained subject to scrutiny under
section one of the Sherman Act.163 Otherwise, the teams’ grants of the exclusive
license was not subject to review under that section.164
The Court ultimately found that the thirty-two NFL teams were in fact separate, profit-maximizing entities with separate interests in licensing team trademarks.165 As such, the plaintiff could challenge the NFL’s action under Section
1 of the Sherman Act.166 While American Needle involved the NFL, its reasoning behind whether a contract deprives the marketplace of independent centers
of decision-making within a single sports league could apply to other similarly
structured professional sports leagues, including the NBA.167
There are several reasons why conclusions about the NBA’s organizational
form made in the context of an antitrust law challenge should not control such
an inquiry for purposes of state law. To begin, the different organizational options typically considered in the antitrust context are different than in the state
organization law context. For example, the court in Chicago Bulls II limited
itself to two organizational options—a single entity or a joint venture.168 In state
organization law, it is not clear what “single entity” means, for all organizational
forms are treated as single entities; that is true of partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and corporations. Moreover, the term “joint
venture” alone does not indicate what organizational form that joint venture has
taken. By default, a joint venture is a partnership,169 but the parties could have
formed it in some other organizational form. Not only do courts in these antitrust cases not focus on these different organizational forms, but their inquiry
into whether an entity is a joint venture does not even comport with the joint
venture test under state organization law.170
162

Id. at 191–95.
Id. at 191–92.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 196–97.
166
Id.
167
For a discussion of how Chicago Bulls II reconciles with American Needle, see Herbert
Hovencamp, American Needle and the Boundaries of the Firm in Antitrust Law 18-19 (Working Paper,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616625.
168
Chi. Prof’l Sports L.P. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 1996).
169
See discussion supra Part III.B.
170
See id.
163
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In addition, the goals of the federal antitrust law regime and the state organizational law regime are different. Antitrust law, on the one hand, seeks to protect consumers by preserving competition.171 Thus, the focus of the inquiry is
on whether various market participants acted anti-competitively toward consumers.172 State organization law, on the other hand, focuses on ensuring managers act faithfully to achieve the business purpose.173 Moreover, it seeks to
impose default terms to govern the associated parties’ on-going relationship absent agreement to the contrary.174 Thus, organization law shifts the focus away
from consumers and toward the owners and managers of the business; away
from protecting the public from harm and toward creating a functional, longterm business relationship. These different policy rationales justify conducting
separate inquiries into the NBA’s organizational structure under state organizational law from that conducted under federal antitrust law. Thus, as the Supreme
Court recognized in American Needle, state organizational form does not affect
the inquiry into a violation of federal antitrust laws.175 The opposite is true, as
well; conclusions about businesses drawn for purposes of federal antitrust law
do not control the state organization law analysis.
Case law is not alone in ignoring the NBA’s organizational structure outside
of the antitrust realm; academic commentary, too, fails to discuss the NBA’s
structure under state organization law.176 The dearth of such discussions further
emphasizes the void in the literature about the NBA’s structure under state organization law.
B. Governing Law: New York
Before analyzing the NBA’s legal categorization under state law, it must
first be determined which state’s laws govern the inquiry. Here, the NBA’s
Constitution does not select a governing law. Thus, the governing law must be
determined by application of conflict-of-law principles.
Regardless of whether the NBA is partnership, NUA, or solely a contract,
171
See Babette Boliek, Antitrust, Regulation, and the “New” Rules of Sports Telecasts, 65
HASTINGS L. J. 501, 509 (2014).
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See, e.g., supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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See discussion supra Part III.B.
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See discussion supra Part III.B.
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See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, The Supreme Court’s Renewed Focus on Inefficiently Structured Joint
Ventures, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 261, 263 (2011). See generally Michael A. Flynn & Richard J. Gilbert,
The Analysis of Professional Sports Leagues as Joint Ventures, 111 THE ECON. J. 27 (2001).
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the inquiry seems fairly clear: New York law governs. To refresh, if the NBA
is a partnership, the applicable law is the law of the jurisdiction of its chief executive office.177 Because the NBA’s corporate office and headquarters are in
New York,178 New York law governs. If the NBA is an NUA, the applicable
law is the law in which the NBA conducts the majority of its affairs.179 That
again is New York, given the location of the NBA’s corporate office and headquarters in New York.180 Finally, even if the NBA is solely a contractual relationship among its members, New York law governs. That is because New
York is the state with the most ties to the transaction given that the NBA’s corporate office and headquarter are in New York.
C. NBA as a Partnership or NUA
The NBA has not been formed as a limited partnership, limited liability
company, or corporation. To form as one of these legal entities, the NBA would
have had to file an instrument of formation with the Secretary of State in the
state of organization. Without one of these filings, the only potential organizational forms applicable to the NBA are a partnership and NUA.
An analysis of whether the NBA is a partnership or NUA, as compared to a
contract, must begin with whether the NBA team-owners have associated to
pursue one or more joint objectives. If they have, then either partnership or
NUA law applies. Otherwise, contract law will govern that relationship without
application of partnership or NUA law.
In the case of the NBA, it is clear that the team-owners have associated to
pursue at least one common objective—to operate a professional basketball
league. The nature of this association allows them to coordinate regular and
playoff game days and times; game rules; dispute resolution procedures; the
election of a manager (Commissioner); and the addition of new teams; among
other things. The existence of a management structure similar to that used in
business corporations also reflects the level of cooperation needed—and
achieved—to operate a unified professional basketball league. The court in
American Needle even recognized the need for this kind of cooperation to operate a professional sports league.181 Thus, it is clear the NBA is an association,
177
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at least for purposes of operating a professional basketball league.
Whether the NBA is a partnership or NUA depends on the nature of that
association. In the case of the NBA, the association is arguably not to pursue a
commercial objective. A business is a commercial endeavor.182 Here, the team
members have associated in creating these league rules to avoid utter chaos on
the court and in the operation of the league. That, in turn, allows the members
to operate a unified basketball league. Thus, they are arguably not employed to
pursue a joint profit-seeking business.
However, the more likely view is that the team members have associated to
create these league rules not merely to further the social cause of operating a
professional basketball league, but to maximize the collective revenues of the
entire league. Part of this conclusion stems from the nature of NBA team revenue-sharing. Again, under the CBA, teams share in any excess taxes paid by
teams that have exceeded the annual salary cap.183 Teams also share merchandising and broadcast revenues from contracts that the board of governors authorizes the Commissioner to enter into on behalf of the league.184 In other
words, teams, through their collectively-appointed managers, are leveraging the
team-owners’ joint assets—the right to collect merchandising revenues from the
licensing of the teams’ collective marks and the right to collect broadcast revenues from the licensing of all NBA team games—to maximize revenues for the
league and, in turn, for the team-owners. In fact, the equal sharing of those
revenues tracks the default partnership rules on equal sharing of profits among
partners.185 Clearly, this monetization of collective rights to intellectual property is not necessary to operate an effective professional basketball league. Rather, it is clearly designed to financially benefit the NBA member teams.
The NBA might respond that profit-sharing is not intended to be a partnership; rather, it is intended to be a method to equalize revenues among teams to
ensure the league operates effectively. In other words, the purpose for the sharing of profits is to further the social purpose of ensuring the survival of a professional basketball league.
However, the sharing of those revenues in conjunction with the association
of team-owners at least raises a presumption of partnership.186 It would then
182
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fall to the NBA to prove that no partnership was intended.187
The NBA might also respond that operating a professional basketball league
is not a profit-seeking venture, but a social venture. Yet, even if one were to
acknowledge that team owners derive much social value from operating a functional professional basketball league, partnership law does not exclude these
types of social motivations from its scope. Entrepreneurs involved with closely
held businesses often make business decisions on the basis of emotion.188 That,
however, does not prevent the existence of a for-profit motive. It simply means
that the individuals are getting personal satisfaction out of their joint investment.
If the NBA is not a partnership because the joint profit-motive of the NBA,
teams cannot be established; then the NBA is an NUA under New York law.
That is because it remains an association of team-owners, even if they do not
jointly pursue a business profit. While in some jurisdictions this leads to the
imposition on the members of rights and duties similar to those under partnership law,189 in New York, the laws governing NUAs are essentially the laws of
contracts.190 In other words, there would be no default rights of NBA team
members, and no default duties of those team members. As such, the NBA
Constitution and Bylaws, along with other contracts among members, would set
out the terms of the association by and among the members.191
V. CONCLUSION: CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL CATEGORIZATION OF THE NBA
While courts and commentators have given substantial treatment to the
NBA’s structure, those discussions have not focused on the NBA’s structure for
purposes of state organization law. As I have argued above, it is important to
identify what organizational form applies to the NBA given the consequences
that could flow from such structure. As I have also argued above, the NBA may
be a partnership, even though there is some basis to conclude it is a NUA.
There are numerous consequences that would flow from the NBA’s categorization as a partnership. Importantly, each member would owe a fiduciary duty
to the other members. That means each member would have a duty to act with
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the requisite degree of care in making partnership decisions.192 Moreover, each
member would have a duty to act loyally, in the best interest of the NBA, and
not in the member’s own self-interest.193
In the case of Donald Sterling, he would have breached his duty of care by
carelessly making remarks that could injure the league’s reputation and the
NBA’s collective brand. He would have also breached his duty of loyalty by
uttering remarks opposed to the best interests of the NBA and its players, and
their desire to maximize league revenues.
Here, the members have not eliminated these fiduciary duties in the NBA
Constitution. While the NBA Constitution does address conflicts of interest,194
that provision does not state that it sets out the exclusive scope of fiduciary duties. Admittedly, the NBA Constitution does not contain such a provision because the NBA does not appear to view itself as a partnership. As such, no
waiver is supposed to be necessary. However, as I argued in Part IV above, it
is entirely plausible that the NBA is a partnership.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the intricacies of how these
fiduciary duties would apply to the NBA’s members. That analysis might be
especially tricky given that the members also seek to maximize profits from
their individually-owned teams. On the other hand, courts in business organization law regularly resolve disputes among business owners who operate competing firms.195
One of the other key consequences to finding the NBA is a partnership is
that any member could seek judicial dissolution due to a fellow partner’s misconduct.196 The other partners could then choose to continue with the partnership, effectively leading to an outcome similar to an expulsion.197 This is true
under New York law, which would govern, as New York allows partners to
waive the right to seek judicial dissolution.198 Without such a waiver in the
NBA Constitution, presumably any member could exert this right.
This right could have been useful as pressure mounted on the NBA members to expel Donald Sterling after he made racist remarks. Instead of wringing
their hands and wondering whether the NBA Constitution afforded them the
192
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right to expel Sterling and, if so, whether they could garner enough votes to do
so, any member could have petitioned a court to dissolve due to Sterling’s misconduct. The grounds likely would have been that Sterling was “guilty of such
conduct as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business.”199 Alternatively, arguably Sterling either breached the partnership agreement by uttering a racist remark to the extent justifying a fine under the NBA Constitution,
or “conduct[ed] himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him.”200
Again, the remaining members could then have opted to continue with the partnership business after this dissolution, effectively removing Sterling from the
partnership.
On the other hand, NBA members might not want other members to have
this right. As such, assuming the NBA is a partnership, the partners would remove this right in the NBA Constitution.
While these rights of members would arise in the case of a fellow member’s
wrongdoing, there are numerous other rights—most of them default—that
would also arise if the NBA were a New York partnership. If the members did
not see a need for these rights and default terms, they could specifically agree
to eliminate them.201 Absent such an agreement, a member could plausibly seek
to employ one of the rights provided under state partnership law.
If, alternatively, the NBA is a New York NUA, then members would not
owe fiduciary duties or have statutory expulsion rights, as those rights do not
exist by default under New York NUA law.202 Rather, the terms of the association would be contained in the NBA Constitution and Bylaws and any other
agreements among the members.203 This is likely the state of affairs the NBA
members expect exists, explaining why no member mentioned that Donald Sterling’s racist remarks breached a fiduciary duty or gave right to a claim of expulsion. On the other hand, given the possibility that the NBA is a partnership, if
the members of the NBA want to avoid the existence of these default rights,
they should be explicit about that.
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